GATS
Global and Transnational Sociology

SPRING 2020

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Jessica Kim, Stony Brook University

Dear Section Members,

As is evident from the exceptional essays featured in this issue, global and transnational scholars seem uniquely equipped to shed light on a historic global pandemic rendering equally momentous (and sociological) shock waves. Indeed, insight from migration, race, commodity chain, and labor scholars alike has proven highly relevant for Covid-19.

Yet despite the global character of this crisis, it has rendered, among other things, significant isolation. Thus, it is extremely important for us to—now, more than ever—be kind and patient with ourselves (and with others), and to remember to set aside time for things that bring us joy.

Wishing you all wellness,

-Jess

Alexander D. Hoppe, University of Pennsylvania

Dear GATS section members,

Like everything else for the past couple of months, this semester’s newsletter is filled with commentary on Covid-19. However, our section members add an immensely relevant global and transnational perspective. Essays by Gary Gereffi and Mark Dallas focus on the politics and economics of global value chains, while Claudio Benzecry reminds us of the intimate global connections of production even before the pandemic. Dana Kornberg and Nandita Sharma examine problems of citizenship and borders which are amplified and intensified in times of crisis, particularly for marginalized groups. Finally, we feature an interview with Tim Bartley, whose book Rules without Rights received an honorable mention for the most recent GATS best book award.

Stay safe, keep up the global analysis, and hang in there.

-Alex
MESSAGE FROM THE CHAIR
Sociologists have studied pandemics for some time, although I have not been one of them. Now we all seem to be so engaged because of the ways in which Covid-19 has transformed our lives, and the world. Does that also mean our discipline is now becoming, necessarily, global and transnational too?

The Forms of Crisis

The late Ulrich Beck, after all, spoke of how global crises might generate the cosmopolitan consciousness we need to address climate change, world poverty and other global risks. Pandemics certainly could lead his list. But it’s not so obvious that a more global awareness is what we are seeing before us, even among us sociologists. Those of us with more global
awareness might have been better prepared for this crisis, however.

Perhaps each of us can recount how Covid-19 entered our lives as existential disruption or anticipated crisis. For me, my friend and colleague Mujun Zhou wrote from China to her friends abroad in the beginning of March reflecting on her experience with the virus and its sociological aura (see her subsequent Facebook posts). I had myself just come back from the Philadelphia Eastern Sociological Society meetings in February’s end where it was hardly mentioned. And now it’s all that most folks talk about, at an appropriate distance. But Covid-19 is not always discussed in global terms.

I’m struck by the various spatial and chronological scales different scholarly, professional, political, and civic interventions mobilize. Each of us might talk of (our) neighborhoods and the solidarities they move across homes with songs across rooftops and solidarity-infused shopping trips. Political leaders with variously sized constituencies balance contradictory demands and abiding quests to extend their own legitimations as they figure new ways to mobilize state capacities. Some states rely more on expertise than others to figure their policies; even before the crisis in the USA, Trump diminished the potential social science capacity of his office to address the pandemic. Many in his network, but not only there, also speak of public health and economic security as trade-offs.

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had myself just come back from the Philadelphia Eastern Sociological Society meetings in February’s end where it was hardly mentioned. And now it’s all that most folks talk about, at an appropriate distance. But Covid-19 is not always discussed in global terms.

Some folks within nations and across the world suffer dramatically more than others, and some still find ways to profit from the crisis. Racism and xenophobia flare, domestic assault skyrockets, and authoritarians find ways to extend their own power and prejudice. Protests are difficult with lockdowns and other stay-at-home expressions imposed, favoring on-line actions in various professional associations. The effects on the environment are also to be determined; we do see, however, some reclamations by other animals of human spaces.

We used to wonder whether we overused the term crisis; now it does not seem to be powerful
enough to characterize the times in which we live.

**The Scales of Crisis**

There is no question that this catastrophe will change the world as we know it. Few have the luxury of time or space to imagine the alternative futures emerging from this crisis, but there is no doubt that figuring those dystopian and progressive possibilities is critical to minimizing the risk of the former, while enabling hopes for the latter. But as politics polarize and inequalities magnify, the ability to imagine coherent transformations grounded in everyday life also suffers.

Those on the front-lines of this crisis are working hard to figure how to keep people, institutions, organizations, and businesses alive. Within our own professional association, we agonize over whether our conference in San Francisco will take place in August (I won’t tell you where the smart money is), and if it doesn’t, how we will coordinate our mutual learning. Our universities send out almost daily emails telling us how things are changing. Those focused on politics are noting the immediate impact of Covid-19 on their political choices, whether in determining political candidates or in legislative initiatives. Even global organizations focus on particular and immediate risks in order to magnify the value of their interventions. For example, Open Society Foundations (truth be told I work with them) focuses their recent interventions in New York City, London, Berlin, Puerto Rico, Baltimore, Budapest, Milan, and Southern Africa among other places even as they work to develop their vision for a world in the pandemic’s aftermath.

While the stories, images, and practices associated with this pandemic may enjoy remarkable global resonance, it may also be hard to think beyond our homes, our neighborhoods, and our proximate organizations given the challenges we face. We may cope better with immediate tasks when we reduce the scale of our imaginations. But in so doing, we are even more unprepared for what is to come with, and I hope after, this global pandemic. #GATSSociology ought provide some guidance for how we might manage just that. And we do.

Of course we might work as the late Immanuel Wallerstein and other world system sociologists have done, and figure relative ascents and declines of nations, their states, and places within them. We do need to think with the longue duree, but crises like these also invite us to imagine global alternatives within existing terms and beyond them too. As we do, it’s useful not only to recognize alternative contexts from which these visions might be conjured, but as well the actors they presume to be relevant.
States matter. Their variable powers shape who gets what and why in this dash for Covid-19 supplies. Each state is likely to increase its capacities while globalization becomes evermore the bogeyman enabling pandemic. And while it may be too simplistic to distinguish approaches by male and female heads of state, it does seem to matter in whose hands state powers rest, and what powers they deploy. But which hands of the state will increase their grip defining alternative futures after Covid-19?

Once envisioned as a liberating technology, digital formations still offer means for resistance, especially in circumstances so isolated as pandemic measures move. In one recent exchange, Suzanne Lea shared the importance of the global platform Safecity for providing common spaces for survivors of sexual abuse, an injustice all the more likely within households during lockdowns. But these same digital technologies also enable measures of surveillance Huxley and Orwell could have never dreamed. Now, as South Korea’s technological fix earns applause alongside some anxious pause across the world, we can see a new world coming, whether we know it’s happening or not. Witnessing how those technologies and techniques of surveillance travel is a critical #GATSociology.

Walls are hardly 21st century, or so many of us thought. Nonetheless, the growing demand by leaders and publics alike for stricter border controls, defining the desirable and undesirable traveler along the way, is not limited to a quest to find who carries a virus. This channels the possibility for a new global apartheid, one that relegates the already marginalized – migrants and refugees most notably -- to an even greater precarity. And this all in the name of a public health defined by citizenship with its many different layers of privilege. We once asked who has the right to the city. Now we can ask about parks and health care. Or higher education.

Universities may have celebrated the global flow of ideas and research, but international students became in this century the bread and butter of an ever more costly system of higher education in the West. It has been driven by a quest for global status rankings more than in meeting proximate public needs. With the economic implications of
pandemic, we can anticipate a number of US colleges and universities going under, even as the pressure to economize grows; Zoom and other distant communication tools will be even more central to how we teach, how we learn. Whether that is good for learning, much less civic engagement and critical thinking, remains to be seen. The precious community that struggled against inequality on campus is in shatters as we move learning online. The individualized student consumer, rather than that proximate public moved to engagement, could be the outcome. Many global corporations could prefer that outcome.

The future of global organizations hardly seems clear in these times either. The World Health Organization, one might presume central to engaging a pandemic, is under authoritarian assault. The European Union has also been stressed by authoritarian practices from Brexit to an increasingly authoritarian Hungary; it faces what French President Macron calls a “make or break” moment. Generally speaking, we typically see extensive reorganization of multi-lateral institutions after a crisis. This is a dramatic moment of TBD.

Which institutions survive is a question, but I am confident that we will see an escalation of social conflict within and across societies. But some of these conflicts are hard to see. We already witness the search for new modes of publicizing injustice and recommendations for solidarity in India. Anindita Adhikari and other sociologists are part of a movement to document the effects of lockdown and ways that solidarity might be extended. It was already difficult to mobilize solidarity with Ukraine in its war with Russia and its proxies in the eastern part of the country, but that very condition also makes it hard to know how severe the health crisis is when it comes to Covid-19.

Conflict is not of course limited to regions in war; class conflict, notably in the health sector, is increasingly apparent. Sociologists can contribute by identifying the prior conditions and dangers facing health care workers and others on the front-line of this crisis, as well as the conditions of their mobilization, the counter-mobilization and threats they face, and other circumstances of their work. We also see growing conflict within the education sector.

Within the US, undergraduate students organize in order to make claims on university budgets to address their own needs, even while international students are, once again, in a precarious position...
when it comes to identifying their own particular needs. At my own university, Stand Up for Graduate Student Employees mobilized in mid-April to “minimize economic insecurity, provide better healthcare, and protect graduate students and other vulnerable university employees” in the face of this anticipated global recession. Equity for international students was part of their agenda; it’s not always evident in student movements.

What degrees of suffering become acceptable in this crisis? How is that suffering distributed? What measures will be used to make those degrees and distribution acceptable? Each institution, each polity, will find their own means to justify allocations of resources and the rules used to legitimate them. Although I would be shocked to see universities mobilize explicit racism and xenophobia in this contest, we already see other authorities, their institutions and publics increasingly mobilize xenophobia and racism to justify those patterns.

The contest within America over naming Covid-19 with its presumed Chinese origins has long precedence in this country’s racist practice. Associating Covid-19 with Muslims finds fertile soil in an India declaring some citizens more foreign than others. Across Southeast and East Asia, rivalries marked by a hashtag, #MilkTeaAlliance, signal not only distrust but very different imagined political futures in the wake of the pandemic.

Even without manifest racist or xenophobic discourse, disparities in suffering the effects of Covid-19 are extreme. Within the USA, people of color have been, so far, hardest hit for a variety of reasons not having anything to do with their race, but with the racism structuring this country from the kinds of jobs, if available, folks have to the incarceration that puts people of color disproportionately at risk. The indigenous across all the Americas have been notably put at risk by this virus. Genocide is on the minds of some, recalling centuries of expropriation and death. Whether one identifies Palestinians as indigenous or not, confinement to the West Bank and Gaza in the time of a pandemic like this promises extraordinary loss of life.

I could go on, but in conclusion, I want to mark some of the ways in which I see #GATSociology
in evidence across this emerging #PandemicSociology.

**GATSociology’s Interventions in Crisis**

First, it should be noted that many journals and associations have invited scholars to contribute to the sense of this Covid-19 crisis. The *European Sociologist* and *Sociologica* have both issued calls for papers. Before Covid-19 was on everyone’s lips, Bin Xu and Ming-Cheng Lo planned a special issue of *Poetics* to focus on the cultural sociology of disaster. *Contexts* has brought out a special issue devoted to the crisis in Asia. Our own American Sociological Association is organizing a special issue of *Footnotes*, with a contribution from each section of the association. Larry Au will be contributing on our behalf with a paper comparing public spheres on Covid-19 in China and America.

Not all sociologists are focused on the global and transnational, but that doesn't mean it's not critical to our own GATSociological imaginations. Consider, for example, how Linda Redbird leads a team at Northwestern to track how the US public feels, thinks, about the crisis and the way the country is moving. NYU’s Eric Klinenberg contributed an essay early on to emphasize the importance of social solidarity even while we practice physical distancing. GATSociology professor Gianpaolo Baiocchi works with colleagues in New York not only to organize his own apartment building, but to make the case for a national rent moratorium in this crisis. Social Science Research Council President Alondra Nelson initiated a crowd-sourced CoronaVirusSyllabus. Six women, “Those Nerdy Girls”, have developed a Facebook Page called “Dear Pandemic” (thanks for the tip, Leah VanWey). Singaporean academics are combining resources on how to account for the pandemic in their country (thanks for the tip, Suba Devan). These different initiatives, methods and concepts can stimulate our own GATS sensibilities.

It would be easy to blur the differences between methodological nationalism and the importance of states in this period. Explaining how states function in these times is critical, even while we need to understand them in broader global and transnational contests. GATSociology member Cindy Buckley and her colleagues are working on state capacities in this regard, notably how in the post-Soviet space inequalities in the provision of social welfare services (such as healthcare) lead to vulnerabilities that can be exploited by aggressor states (notably Russia in their case).

Understanding how Russia responds to this Covid-19 crisis cannot be understood well without placing it in the larger global knowledge cultural
problem of information warfare and fake news. The challenge of science and its public dissemination is hard enough, but it’s made worse by Trump’s loose connection to the truth. Indeed, while most Americans focus on Trump’s attack on knowledge and science, even on his own medical advisors, we need to keep in mind that Putin did this long before Trump’s election.

Our colleagues working on global and transnational organizations are in the heart of this too. While its sociological analysis might lay foundations for the World Health Organization’s critique, it’s hard to see sociological foundations for Trump’s attack on the organization. Our colleagues who engage transnational labor and migrants can help challenge the ways in which Covid-19 is used to justify policies denying the vulnerable rights of any sort.

Of course all of our foci should be part of our engaged scholarship. GATsociology scholars are regularly on twitter extending their sociology, from @CraigJCalhoun @SaskiaSassen & @Rhacel to @VictoriaDReyes, @Jean23bean, & @AtefSaid. This too is public sociology with quite a global reach. I’ll follow you. Let me know.

There is no better time for a public sociology, but it’s difficult to practice this at a global and transnational level. There is no question that we need some kind of global solidarity in this crisis. But now that we are at home and connecting with one another online, we might just find a way.

This has been mine: an invitation to extend our knowledge networks so that we might approach the crisis of Covid-19 and its aftermath with a sociological imagination moved not only by the most pressing and powerful, but by attending to those most at risk in these times. Let us figure global futures with them in mind.

Michael D. Kennedy
Section chair
Rules without Rights: Land, Labor, and Private Authority in the Global Economy

An Interview with Tim Bartley
By Smitha Radhakrishnan

Abstract: Activists have exposed startling forms of labor exploitation and environmental degradation in global industries, leading many large retailers and brands to adopt standards for fairness and sustainability. This book is about the idea that transnational corporations can push these rules through their global supply chains, and in effect, pull factories, forests, and farms out of their local contexts and up to global best practices. For many scholars and practitioners, this kind of private regulation and global standard-setting can provide an alternative to regulation by territorially bound, gridlocked, or incapacitated nation states, potentially improving environments and working conditions around the world and protecting the rights of exploited workers, impoverished farmers, and marginalized communities. But can private, voluntary rules actually create meaningful forms of regulation? Are forests and factories around the world being made into sustainable ecosystems and decent workplaces? Can global norms remake local orders? This book provides striking new answers by comparing the private regulation of land and labor in democratic and authoritarian settings. Case studies of sustainable forestry and fair labor standards in Indonesia and China show not only how transnational standards are implemented “on the ground” but also how they are constrained and reconfigured by domestic governance. Combining rich multi-method analyses, a powerful comparative approach, and a new theory of private regulation, this book reveals the contours and contradictions of transnational governance.
S: At this point, sociologists are watching the Covid-19 pandemic spread around the world and trying to make sense of it. Your book is obviously about a very different phenomenon, but do you think it holds any implications for how we should be thinking about the current moment?

T: I don’t think my book holds great insights about how to address this crisis, but there is a basic parallel in the processes involved. My book is fundamentally about how transnational flows are shaped by national governance. In my case, it is transnational flows of products like apparel, footwear, furniture, and paper, as well as accompanying rules about the fairness or sustainability of production processes. I argue that these transnational flows of rules and assurances are profoundly shaped by domestic governance in the places where they are put into practice.

We can see something different but analogous in the Coronavirus pandemic. This is a transnational flow of infections, but we can already see vast differences in how governments are responding—and consequences for the prevalence and fatality of the infection. In South Korea and Taiwan, quick responses with high rates of testing (and intensive digital surveillance and reporting) seem to have limited the spread of the virus. Japan has had much lower rates of testing, but somehow seems to have contained the spread to a much greater degree than have European countries. Within Europe, Germany has had very low fatality rates even as the number of infections has increased exponentially. Denmark quickly shut down nearly everything and passed a massive relief package, while Sweden locked down to a far lesser degree. Comparative sociologists will no doubt be arguing about these different approaches for years to come. My point is simply that the Coronavirus once again highlights the intersection of transnational flows and domestic governance. This is an important focus of inquiry for sociologists working on a variety of topics, from health to finance to human rights.

On a different note, it is also becoming clear that the economic downturn from the Coronavirus in the U.S. and Europe will have dire consequences for the types of workers who are central to my book—that is, those who make clothing, footwear, and home furnishings for export. As brands and retailers cancel and reduce their orders, workers who are already marginalized and in precarious situations will be cast aside with few safety nets. It is not just the Coronavirus itself but also the resulting economic and social dislocation that is spreading globally.

S: One of the many unique features of your book is its multi-sited methodological design. You needed to obtain fairly detailed information within specific industries and companies. Can you tell us how you made and sustained the partner-
ships needed to do the work?

T: You’re right that looking at two different industries—apparel and forest products—in two different countries—Indonesia and China—was a serious challenge. I remember a conversation with Ching Kwan Lee as I was getting started—with me hemming and hawing about what I could really accomplish. She encouraged me to just dive in, with the recognition that there were lots of things I would not be able to do, but plenty that would still be feasible and worthwhile. That advice stuck with me throughout the project.

Once I had some initial contacts in Jakarta, Beijing, Guangzhou, and elsewhere—many of which were provided by practitioners I had met through my previous research or by other scholars who generously helped me get a lay of the land—things could snowball from there. I owe a lot to several colleagues at Indiana University (where I worked when I started the project), Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou (where I spent a semester), people I met at the University of Indonesia and Peking University, and various scholars of China or Indonesia who helped along the way.

Most generally, I found that people enjoy talking about their work if you can demonstrate that you’re serious, thoughtful, and a good listener. I didn’t have strong ties to any particular companies, NGOs, or standard-setting bodies, but I found a number of people within them who were willing to talk candidly. I was also fortunate to get access to data from two surveys that other researchers had conducted—and very generously shared with me. There were of course also lots of dead ends—interviews I couldn’t get and data that proved elusive.

S: Two countries, two industries, so many different layers of rules and regulations! It’s a lot. In synthesizing these sites of inquiry, your book breaks new ground in comparative sociology. Can you tell us how you came up with the design for the study?

T: Originally there was supposed to be a third country—Mexico—in addition to authoritarian China and newly democratic Indonesia. It quickly became clear that this would be too much, and that I could get enough leverage for thinking about democratic versus authoritarian settings with the Indonesia-China comparison. I wanted to continue studying both sustainable forestry and fair labor standards to allow for a comparison of land and labor as Polanyian “fictitious commodities.” And I wanted countries where both apparel and forest products were important export-oriented industries.

“this book a testament to the value of combining original data collection with a close reading of existing case studies and national/area-studies research.”
which narrowed the list substantially. Ultimately, the Indonesia-China comparison allowed me to look at substantively important (and fascinating) cases, think about democratic and authoritarian governance, and develop some theoretical propositions that I hope researchers will want to test in other settings.

As for synthesizing information, this book is a testament to the value of combining original data collection with a close reading of existing case studies and national/area-studies research. As I was writing the substantive chapters at the core of the book, I was also reading a ton of other research on land rights, labor markets, social movements, and the state in Indonesia and China. This greatly enhanced my own understanding and helped me to make the chapters as engaging and contextualized as I could.

S: A project like this is long and arduous. Was there a time you considered throwing in the towel and not finishing it? What kept you going?

T: I never considered throwing in the towel, but I did sometimes think I’d end up like Michael Douglas (Grady Tripp) in Wonder Boys, with a thousand-page unfinishable manuscript. I was lucky to be past the tenure hurdle, so I could afford to be slow and cut back on journal-length papers while I was focused on the book.

T: What advice do you have for graduate students and other scholars considering a large, multi-sited project? How do you figure out what’s ambitious but realistic and actually follow through?

S: This kind of research is exciting to do and important for our field. But the incentives seem to be pushing in the opposite direction—toward less ambitious projects that can be done quickly. Each scholar needs to consider the viability of taking on something big and unwieldy at that point in their careers. Sometimes the solution is to start with one piece/site and add the other piece/site later, once you’ve bought yourself some time and credibility by publishing from the project. Or, even if you develop a multi-sited project from the beginning, I think it’s worthwhile writing your way through it—that is, starting with one or two papers that you can get out for review as you continue with the rest of the research, rather than waiting until you have it all figured out before you write something. The writing process, and the feedback you get on these early papers, can help you figure out what’s most important and what can be bracketed.

Claudio E. Benzecry (Northwestern) has a forthcoming book, *The Global Shoe: The work of creativity across borders*, which follows the footsteps of globalization through footwear design and development in Brazil, China and the US. It is under contract with University of Chicago Press. The following is an excerpt from the book’s coda.

*Shoe is a gipsy business.*

“In the lives of emperors there is a moment which follows pride in the boundless extension of the territories we have conquered, and the melancholy and relief of knowing we shall soon give up any thought of knowing and understanding them.”

*Italo Calvino, Invisible Cities*
n the adjacent image Dwayne is going from the sample room and development office for OM—the brand whose designs I followed closely through my fieldwork—to one of the small factories they contract with for final production. Unlike other technical work discussed in the book, he’s there not as things move along but rather to make sure the production process is carried according to the company’s instructions, and that the final product—shoes to be shipped ASAP to the United States—are identical to the final approved samples OM has seen. As he walked me through the factory, explaining the organization of the assembly line, he told me he was on the lookout for two things: who was in charge of the [shoe] lasting machine—if it was a different person than the last time he visited he immediately felt that it wasn’t a trustworthy operation—and whether the final shoes inside the boxes not only match the samples but look identical to each other. Having been a line builder for most of his life, he had the knowledge to make the call for when he thought something didn't seem OK. As he opened the boxes with boots about to ship he played with them, making sure they looked and felt identical. When things didn't work out, he called the manager and then went to the end of the assembly line where female workers did quality control by hand, evening out small details with a cutter. Earlier in our sojourn he also explored the discarded shoes—all of them marked with a white dot to make sure those pieces were not salvageable. He was there to make sure quality was achieved, as well as to make certain the paying customer wasn’t taken for a ride when it came to the cost of the operation.

Dwayne was called “the shoe doctor” among designers at OM and by the rest of the
management at the developer where OM did one of its lines. He was made to fly from his home in Texas a few times a year just to control the match between development and production. This almost magical character embodied in his skill the recognition that, as historian Ken Alder (2001) put it, “the price of standards is eternal vigilance.” His tasks also directed our attention to something else: the almost impossible character of the enterprise given its planetary expansion over time, the disjuncture between expertise and cheap labor, and the limited capacity for reproducing the conditions to make sure that match is a virtuous one as development and production become further and further geographically divorced. Shoe production is trapped between its attempts for controlling and knowing everything that is going on at a distance and the melancholy of understanding the impossibility in the long run of such an endeavor. Throughout fieldwork I learned of Taiwanese owners who closed factories in Huenzhou because of the impracticality of reproducing standards there; of other compatriot owners, agents, and technicians who have folded their shops and moved back to the island; of Brazilians who moved to Chengdu or were offered to move to Ethiopia, where American developers (allied with Chinese capitalists) had opened factories and needed folks with long-term experience in the industry to supervise the daily operation. I also met American and Italian designers who refused to keep moving further into China, as Dongguan had finally become a place with an “international” leisure area in which they could all mingle and have fun. Moreover, I interviewed Brazilians agents who have moved to South China to do their samples, but were considering how to move some of the production back to Brazil after the currency collapse of 2017.

As I finished fieldwork in 2017, I was learning how much of production had left the Dongguan area as well as how much of its command and control functions were slowly being passed to (or was it taken away by?) a competing delegation center: Ho Chi Min City. Closer to factories in Myanmar, Cambodia, the Philippines, Indonesia and other parts of Vietnam itself, the city had a cluster of expert services thanks to the previous establishment of the

“Will the speed of capital as it passes through places erase the history of the slower pace of a skill that dwells in bodies? Despite its divergent histories of development, would we end up just seeing the seriality of these spectral places in the way of capital?”
sneaker industry in the area. For many of the Brazilians I interviewed and spent time with, the question about moving there wasn’t one about whether but rather when. In a lot of cases my contact with key players in town had become harder as they were spending more and more time in the former Saigon. Some of them were opening a leather supply shop, similar to the one they had in Shenzhen; some others were moving the quality control operations closer to the factories there; some more were constantly coming and going, sometimes reuniting in the new context with old acquaintances from the Vale do Sinos area, getting leads on full time positions.

The potential end of the history of Brazilians in China was part and parcel of a longer point, the gipsy business of shoe making—as Marcio, a developer who moved to China after 20 years of working in Brazil, called it—in which development follows much later, at a slower pace, after cheap labor has moved. If Ho Chi Min City appeared as the future, with knowledge and suppliers already in there, side by side with cheap labor, what would that say about what I witnessed in Dongguan? Was Novo Hamburgo—the place where US buyers made their shoes in the 90s—and its infrastructural ruins both the past and the future of Dongguan?

The first factory I visited with Grace was now a kindergarten—much like the one I ventured into in Canudos with my Brazilian assistant. Development rooms were moved farther from the city center, in Houjie, as owners closed full-scale factories and instead received the terminated parts of the cheapest parts of the process from elsewhere. If South China and South Brazil were a study in contrast and comparison, where the bustling craziness of afternoon total gridlock resounded like an explosion next to the emptiness and quietness of my walks to visit developers through downtown Novo Hamburgo; will Ho Chi Min City turn Dongguan into an empty shell? Will the speed of capital as it passes through places erase the history of the slower pace of a skill that dwells in bodies? Despite its divergent histories of development, would we end up just seeing the seriality of these spectral places in the way of capital? Unfortunately, as social scientists, our answers to this can’t be to decry the melancholy brought by the futility of understanding the vastness of the territories we aim to know. Writing this was an attempt to make sense of it all.
Goodbye to Borders

By Nandita Sharma

Note to readers: This piece was originally published in the Fabian Society’s quarterly magazine, the Fabian Review.

Have you noticed that the only time governments acknowledge the needs of working people is when they are bashing immigrants for all our worries and woes? Around the world, politicians seem to only talk about how important it is to protect people’s access to jobs and social benefits when they are putting in place ever-stricter immigration controls. It is more than just a little bit galling that the same governments dismantling people’s economic and social security then go on to assure us that it is their concern over their citizens’ welfare that leads them to promote anti-immigrant policies.

Although we are encouraged to view immigration controls as something which protects workers, it is far more realistic to see immigration controls as protecting capital and upholding governments that put profit above all else.

The separations created between citizens and migrants gives capital an enormous tool to cheapen the cost of hiring labour and weaken the working class. Immigration controls are also of enormous political benefit to nation states looking for easy scapegoats to explain away policies – like austerity – that fail working people but enrich capital. The tragedy of our times is that citizens are more likely to rise up against working immigrants than they are to rise up against capital or the state.

It is time that working people reject the divisions created by distinctions of nationality and fight for a world without borders. For our own survival, we must address the dangerous escalation of anti-immigrant policies head on. Our collective failure to do so will only strengthen capital against workers and further embolden far right demagogues who use our hopes and dreams for a better future against us. I offer my top three reasons why a ‘no borders’
political position is the one that best serves working people, citizens and migrants alike.

1. Because immigration controls don’t actually stop people from immigrating

Nation-states portray their immigration controls as something that will actually stop people from moving. Nothing could be further from the truth – and not because we haven’t yet built high enough walls or x-rayed enough lorries. The most fundamental reason immigration controls don’t work is that human beings have always moved when they need to. They’ve done so for a whole host of reasons: fleeing harm or scarcity, searching for peace and prosperity, being with those they care about, or for just sheer adventure.

This is in stark contrast to states and the ruling classes that have historically moved their militaries to loot, conquer, and rule over those they encounter. Indeed, the very category of ‘immigrant’ is a state invention rooted in colonial activities. The category of ‘immigrant’ was only invented once the category of ‘slave’ was abolished. In 1835, the year the British Empire ended slavery, planters and the imperial state were each worried that ending slavery would also end the enormous profits flowing from the colonies, so sought alternative ways to commandeer and control a new workforce. The ‘solution’ they offered was immigration controls. First imposed upon a newly recruited workforce of so-called coolie labour, initial controls required ‘coolie workers’ to show contracts of indenture to newly minted immigration agents in British India and to new immigration agents in the colonies they were headed to work. Without these contracts, they would be denied permission to move. These contracts thus represent the first set of “papers” states required people to have to enter their territories. From the start, immigration controls have been a way for states to suppress the power of workers to the benefit of capital.

Immigration controls were then – and are now – far less interested in stopping people from moving than in restricting their rights once they are within the state’s territories. Immigration controls certainly do have lethal outcomes – tens of thousands of people have died trying to cross national borders in the past decade alone and millions more waste away in refugee camps which are temporary in name only. Yet, what immigration controls primarily allow states to do is to subordinate migrating people within national societies. Today, fewer people are given a status that comes with some rights –
such as ‘permanent resident’ or ‘refugee’ – while more and more people have unlawful or temporary status which leaves them with little choice but to take jobs that offer significantly less pay and far more dangerous conditions.

This leads me to the second reason to abolish national borders: namely, that immigration controls are bad for workers, citizens and migrants alike.

2. Because borders don’t work for workers but work brilliantly for capital

While we are told that immigration controls curtail competition for jobs, in actuality they create more competition in the labour market. Immigration controls, because they legislate differential wage rates and levels of power for citizens than for migrants, are a major tool in the arsenal of capital and states. State revenues increase as migrants pay taxes of all sorts but are ineligible for many state services. Capital enjoys both the bounty of paying immigrant workers less in wages and facing less pressure to improve wages or working conditions.

There are very few studies on the immigration wage gap between citizens and migrants with varying statuses. However, one USA-based study found that in 2000 there was an 18.4 per cent wage gap between men with US citizenship and men with US permanent residency status and that this gap was double what it had been in 1980. Another study, comparing the wages of Mexican-Americans (who already receive far lower wages than average white Americans) and Mexican nationals working without legal papers found a whopping 78 per cent wage gap in 2007. Undocumented immigration status – the fastest rising status given to migrants – is a significant factor in dramatically lowering one’s wages. This outcome is wholly a result of ever more severe immigration restrictions.

Now, some will say that a wholesale end to immigration will remove this power from employers and the state. There are two main limitations to such an approach however. First, despite the nationalist story that “the nation is a community of equals”, we know very well that subordinating immigrants is not the only way employers create a precarious workforce: Long before the existence of immigration controls, capitalists used sexist, racist, ageist, and ableist divisions to cheapen and weaken the labour of subordinated groups, and they still do. Secondly, it is immigration controls which weaken the working class, not immigrant workers. And it is the nationalism of
such as ‘permanent resident’ or ‘refugee’ – while more and more people have unlawful or temporary status which leaves workers that ensures that an anti-immigrant politics works against their own needs and works so brilliantly for capital and states.

This leads me to my third reason for supporting a no borders political position: the call for ever more restrictive immigration controls is leading us towards a police state.

**3. Because immigration controls lead to a police state**

A worldwide system of national immigration controls has been in place for about 75 or so years, since the end of the second world war when both the former colonies and former metropoles of Empires became separate nation states. Since that time, nationalist demagogues trot out anti-immigrant politics as they vie for working people’s votes. They tell us that curtailing or ending immigration is a simple legislative exercise: decree it and it will happen. This is a political lie.

The reality of the human need – and desire – to move cannot be curtailed without a police state. Tragically, we are living in the midst of such a reality being put into place. European Union member nation states have broken what was considered a fundamental law of the sea by refusing to rescue migrants. The United States has engaged in a premeditated policy of family separation and erected what many Jewish organisations and survivors of Japanese internment camps call concentration camps. Children as young as a few months old are imprisoned there without adequate food, water, clothing, beds, medical care or even soap. Everywhere, nation-states demand greater deportation powers to raid workplaces, schools, and homes in search of those without immigration papers. Armed vigilantes roam the borders and streets of nation-states ready to take immigration law into their own hands and execute migrants. This – and more – is the result of the growing demand to enforce a fantasy of national control over human movement. Without a concerted effort to renounce anti-immigrant politics, we are doomed to more of the same, particularly as the destructive forces of the impending capitalist climate catastrophe reveals its full force and more people move for their lives.

To imagine that a police state stops at the harassment, expulsion or even extermination of those considered as ‘foreign contagions’ to the national body politic is to ignore the violent history of fascism. Those categorized as ‘foreigners’ are
not the last to face fascist attacks. Or to put it another way, many people long accustomed to being members of the nation can be declared to be ‘foreigners’ and have their citizenship stripped away. Already, retention of citizenship has already been significantly weakened in the UK, as we have seen predominantly with the Windrush scandal. A fundamental principle of organising to win is to have a clear-headed view of reality. A world without national border controls better suits the lived reality of our times. Human mobility is not going to end because some nationalists want it to. But the rights and liberties we take for granted just might. We can harness immigration to working people’s advantage by refusing to allow capital and states to use nationality or immigration statuses to divide us from one another. Were we to do so, we would undermine the age old strategy of creating false enemies while letting the real ones rule.

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SPECIAL FEATURE: COVID—19
CORONAVIRUS:
A GATS PERSPECTIVE

Featuring essays by:

Gary Gereffi
“Sociology and the Global Economy: Pressing Issues Abound for Evolving Research Communities,”

Mark P. Dallas
“Global Value Chain Research in a COVID-19 World: Resilience, Systemic Interactions, and Governance Vacuums,”

And Dana Kornberg
“Indian Muslims in a time of CAA-NRC, pogroms, and now coronavirus.”
The global economy has never been more central in public consciousness than it is today. The novel coronavirus global pandemic in recent months has focused attention on the international transmission routes and vectors of the disease, and supply chain shortages and export controls on medical equipment used in the testing and treatment of Covid-19 patients have become matters of national security. The rise of protectionism and economic nationalism have replaced decades of expansive trade and foreign investment regimes, the multilateral architecture of the postwar Bretton Woods system is crumbling, and some question whether we have arrived at the end of globalization (Buruma, 2016; Farrell and Newman, 2020).

Does sociology have a central contribution to make in these controversies? Sociologists have worked on themes related to the global economy for many decades in ways too numerous to catalog here. From a structural perspective, world-systems theory, which has a prominent place in sociological annals since the pioneering work of Immanuel Wallerstein—who launched this approach in the 1970s—has generated a steady stream of scholarship associated with the Fernand Braudel Center at Binghamton University, State University of New York, and the Political Economy of the World-System (PEWS) section of the ASA. Another strand of research on the global economy has been more actor-oriented with particular attention to the role of multinational corporations (MNCs), whether as power brokers active in shaping the structure of dependent development in countries and global industries as portrayed in dependency theory, or through the impact of foreign direct investment on economic development and inequality, or as a corporate force linked to divergent development trajectories across national borders.

There is a third broad literature that seeks to combine the advantages of both the systemic and actor-centered perspectives on the global economy. Known variously by the global commodity chain (GCC), global value chain (GVC) and global production network (GPN) labels, this research stream has grown exceptionally rapidly during the past 25 years with a significant impact.
across academic, policymaker and practitioner circles alike. Since this approach aligns very well with the scope of the GATS section, the remainder of this essay will sketch some of its main features.

From a sociological perspective, there are several distinctive features of the GVC approach and related literatures. First, it is grounded in a network-centered view of the global economy, which extends key insights from economic and organizational sociology into comparative international research (Hamilton and Gereffi, 2009). Second, it offers a multiscalar perspective that explicitly links the macro (global economy and international system), meso (nation-states and industries) and micro (workers, jobs and communities) levels of analysis (Kano et al., 2020). Third, the GVC perspective has had a major impact on policymakers and international organizations, in part because the development orientation of many researchers leads to detailed country-based research and also because the global industry lens introduces themes that resonate with the constituencies of organizations as diverse as the International Labor Organization, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the World Economic Forum and the UN Conference on Trade and Development, all of which have major GVC-oriented programs (Mayer and Gereffi, 2019; Gereffi, 2019).

The current Covid-19 pandemic has brought home the urgent reality of shortages and bottlenecks in global supply chains for personal protective equipment (PPE) and medical devices like ventilators needed to respond to the marauding virus, but it raises bigger theoretical and research questions as well. Some claim the pandemic will

“Understanding how to anticipate and adapt to the disruptions caused by predictable and unexpected crises in the global economy is one of the critical current concerns for GVC and kindred scholars.”
end globalization as we know it; others predict it will usher in a new world order led by China; and still others call for a return to economic nationalism and the reshoring of supply chains for critical goods and services (Farrell and Newman, 2020; Campbell and Doshi, 2020; Swanson, 2020). It is too soon to know how and when the crisis will end, but for supply chain scholars, “the coronavirus pandemic has illuminated the risks that global supply chains pose to people, economies and the security of nations” (O’Neil, 2020), and the fragility of international multistage production networks has led to various proposals for making them more resilient in the face of intensified global political and economic pressures (Shih, 2020).

The global Covid-19 pandemic has also had a devastating impact on workers and businesses at the bottom of global supply chains, as revealed in a new study of Bangladesh, one of the top three suppliers in the global apparel industry (Anner, 2020). In response to the sudden collapse in demand for garments caused by widespread store closures in Europe, the United States and beyond occasioned by Covid-19, many of the top European and U.S. apparel brands and retailers cancelled or postponed all planned, in-process and already completed production orders with suppliers in Bangladesh, leading to the partial or complete shutdown of a large portion of the 4,000 factories in the country; more than one million factory workers have already been fired or furloughed (temporarily suspended from work) as a result of order cancellations. Similar situations are likely to unfold across numerous producing countries and labor-intensive manufacturing industries around the world. Understanding how to anticipate and adapt to the disruptions caused by predictable and unexpected crises in the global economy is one of the critical current concerns for GVC and kindred scholars.

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References


In a matter of two months, COVID-19 revealed latent weaknesses in global interdependencies. Through classic negative feedback loops and linked networks, these interdependencies have generated broad systemic crises. Most attention has been focused on the dynamic interaction between two global contagions—one epidemiological and the other macro-economic. The rapid diffusion of the disease worldwide and near simultaneity of social distancing requirements have choked off the normal circular flows of economic resources, not just severing GVC links, but also the links between producers and consumers, debtors and creditors, and importers and exporters.

Nearly everywhere, nation-states have taken the lead in combating the dual contagions. Most advanced countries are lucky to already have relatively well-established institutions to fight epidemiological and economic contagions—public health and fiscal-monetary systems—though there has been dramatic variance in their effectiveness. It is also unclear how much national governments will cooperate to deal with collective problems (more below). Because they are less fully institutionalized, it is also unclear if international cooperation can fill this governance vacuum. These include coordination among systemically important central banks, epistemic communities and a global civil society of epidemiologists and NGOs, and formal institutions like the WHO.

Global value chains (GVCs) sit somewhat uncomfortably between the tectonic shifts in macro-economic policymaking and the resurgence in national government activity. Most buyer-supplier linkages and whole chain governance in GVCs will be substantially influenced as multiple and unpredictable waves of the virus rampage through country after country and public health systems of varying qualities play catch-up. This will provide a veritable playground of quasi-natural experiments to test GVC theories in different countries, different products, and within different standards regimes. With high-quality process tracing and
event histories, researchers can pinpoint precise moments of ‘exogenous shock’ (disease, policy changes, etc.) and observe how power and governance in particular GVCs respond. These might include comparisons of large firms and SMEs, GVC linkages with higher or lower levels of industrial concentration, or differing regimes of national or industry standards, among many others.

Furthermore, the multiple crises may generate new concepts for the GVC field. For instance, the concept of value chain ‘resilience’ is not one that is widespread in sociological approaches to GVCs (though it is in supply chain analysis, but unfortunately only in the service of studying ‘firm performance’). Sociological approaches to GVCs could develop the concept of resilience in new directions, for instance, by linking it to a growing literature on global systemic risk.

Beyond these, the dual crises could also extend GVC analysis in new directions. Although GVCs are most commonly studied at more micro-levels as a series of dyadic inter-firm linkages governed by a lead firm and grounded within particular regulatory environments, the crises may reveal that some GVCs can also be studied at more macro-levels as systems of production. For instance, the exogenous shocks mentioned earlier will not only rework intra-chain governance, but are likely to have dynamic impacts that cross over GVCs if supplier and buyer relationships become scrambled—an outcome that becomes more likely as the size and duration of the crises increase. Some excellent GVC research (e.g. work by Jennifer Bair, Matt Mahutga, Andrew Schrank, Will Milberg, Ben Brewer, and Nebahat Tokatli, among others) has already made initial steps in the direction of conceptualizing GVCs as dynamic and temporal systems. However, while their critiques of the GVC literature are strong, there is a risk that they decisively shift the core of the literature away from its original paradigm, potentially throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Given that this crisis is both global and synchronous, it has the potential to reveal some of the underlying sys-

“Sociological approaches to GVCs could develop the concept of resilience in new directions, for instance, by linking it to a growing literature on global systemic risk.”
temic attributes of GVCs more clearly than during ‘normal’ times.

Finally, depending on the crisis, some GVCs are likely to lay at the center of these crises and thus take on attributes of a public good. With the COVID-19 crisis, an immediate example might be medical supplies and pharmaceuticals. However, because GVCs have been fashioned largely by a commercial logic, they are not structured to fulfill this function, ultimately to the detriment of all countries. This will be particularly devastating to poorer countries with fewer resources. This will be particularly devastating to poorer countries with fewer resources.

Furthermore, unlike the highly institutionalized national and international systems of public health and monetary-fiscal stimulus, there are no equivalent public or civil institutions to internationally regulate GVCs like this. In combination, the centrality of medical supplies in combating both contagions and the relative lack of institutionalization has again attracted the nation-state to fill this governance vacuum.

The massive and near simultaneity of the demand shocks for medical supplies was already a strain on these GVCs. However, thus far, their resilience and flexibility have been undermined by neo-mercantilist policies which were implemented across countries in copycat fashion. While it is tempting to label this as typical ‘beggar thy neighbor’ dynamics, the systemic nature of GVCs works against this interpretation. This is because the functional integration across intermediary and final products means that mercantilism does not simply (if only temporarily) shift a domestic problem abroad, but it also directly undermines a country’s own capacity to achieve self-sufficiency. In these ways, GVCs dynamically interact with cascading state policies which again can be conceptualized in systemic fashion, not simply as a series of parallel, if competing, chains.

Normatively, and in combination, these imply that particular GVCs under certain conditions should be regulated internationally for the collective good. Depending on the crisis, these might include food, energy, telecommunications, healthcare and other critical GVCs. However, powerful corporate interests and their influence on key national governments are likely to attenuate this possibility.

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With the coronavirus lockdown in India leading to forced migration and widespread hunger, I’ve been speaking to contacts from my research in Delhi frequently these days, doing what I can to check in and raise money for basic flour and rice. Getting off the phone one with one of my closest contacts yesterday, she vented: “if I hear one more story about Nizamuddin [a historic Muslim neighborhood in Delhi], I think I’m going to lose it. Kanika Kapoor [a Bollywood star] passed it on to all these famous people and high-ranking politicians, but the news reported on it for one day and then forgot about it.” Coming on the heels of removing majority-Muslim Kashmir’s autonomy in August 2019, the passage of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) in December 2019, and anti-Muslim pogroms in Delhi in February 2020, COVID-19 is being conjured up in the national imagination as a Muslim disease, repeatedly being associated with a meeting of the Tablighi Jamaat. It is yet another line of attack.

Even if true (and it was also true that the virus originated in China, but that didn’t justify racist attacks against “Chinese-looking” people), the repetitive twinning of coronavirus and Muslims reinforces a longstanding, and recently heightened, tendency to exclude Muslims from an increasingly Hinduized nation. Labeled “Pakistani” when stereotyped as dangerous, and “Bangladeshi” to signal their undeservingness, Indian Muslims have long been framed by Hindu supremacists and others as outsiders in spite of comprising nearly 15% of the Indian population—a number that, notably, would be even higher if not for India’s violent partition in 1947. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP; Indian People’s Party) has capitalized on and exacerbated these politics, using tactics that range from a cultural politics of promoting vegetarianism to killing humans in the name of protecting cows. Since the destruction of the Babri Masjid (Mosque) in 1992, along with the horrific massacres in Modi’s Gujarat in 2002, BJP candidates have found it expedient to promote violence against Muslims: red meat that energizes their supporters.

If you found yourself feeling confused about the protests taking place vis-à-vis these citizenship
policies, part of the issue is that the mechanism of exclusion, cunningly, appears benign, if not just confusing. The CAA announces its purpose through an inverted logic: rather than excluding Muslims, it explicitly includes nearly every other religious group. The intent becomes clear when combined with the announcement a couple of months later to expand the National Register of Citizens (NRC) to the entire country. The survey officializes who is (and by exclusion, is not) a citizen. When it was carried out in the Bangladesh-bordering state of Assam in 2019, 1.9 million people were declared non-citizens out of 33 million who applied.

In response to the passage of the CAA and expansion of the NRC arose some of the most powerful nationwide social movements that the country has seen. While some commentators wrung their hands over how the explicitly religious implications of the CAA language shifted national commitments away from avowed secularism, Muslim-led protests were born out of the more dire need for basic rights and basic needs. Starting in Assam, the movement spread across the country to cities big and small, mostly led by Muslim women and students. Their momentum increased significantly after students faced violence at the hands of police and Hindu fundamentalists, who entered campuses in Delhi and Lucknow to attack student protesters in early 2020.

If these movements were new, so too was the shock of Delhi becoming the most recent site of anti-Muslim pogroms, or “riots,” as they did in the last week of February 2020. A city-state, Delhi—the-state is not governed by the BJP, but the municipal governments are, and it was a local politician who fanned the flames. Targeting protesters who had been peacefully agitating against the CAA and NRC in Northeast Delhi, Hindu supremacists called for their dispersal and began attacking Muslim-owned shops and protesters themselves. After nearly a week of violent uprising, 53 people were killed, and my contacts and social media reveal that Hindu residents of the area—who were not the main perpetrators of the violence—are now calling for, and sometimes physically ensuring, that Muslims not be allowed into the area. The effect, it seems, is the CAA-NRC in miniature.
The world is in too much of a lurch right now to know where this will all lead. The longest-standing site of protest, Shaheen Bagh, was shut down by the coronavirus lockdown in late March. Aid for those affected by the violence of the pogroms in Northeast Delhi, meanwhile, has had to expand immeasurably to reach the millions now made suddenly penniless by the lockdown. Yet, if Indian Muslims have long suffered from exclusions and violence wrought by Hindu supremacists, so too do their critiques and promotion of solidarity suggest vital pathways that might lead to greater goodwill and prosperity. It is these threads that will be taken up once the movement is able to emerge from this lockdown-enforced pause.

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Alexander Hoppe’s manuscript, “Coordinating Transnational Futurework in Fashion Design,” was nominated for the all-academy Carolyn Dexter Award for Best International Paper and Best Student-Led Paper Award from Managerial and Organizational Cognition Division of the Academy of Management.

Jessica Kim received a National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant (NSF: DDRI) for her dissertation, “The Diffusion of Democracy Norms” How Democracy INGOs Contribute to Hybrid Regimes.”
MEMBER PUBLICATIONS
Books


In this book, Cedric de Leon analyzes two pivotal crises in the American two-party system: the first resulting in the demise of the Whig party and secession of eleven southern states in 1861, and the present crisis splintering the Democratic and Republican parties and leading to the election of Donald Trump. Recasting these stories through the actions of political parties, de Leon draws unsettling parallels in the political maneuvering that ultimately causes once-dominant political parties to lose the people's consent to rule.


From Lake Chad to Iraq, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) provide relief around the globe, and their scope is growing every year. Policy makers and activists often assume that humanitarian aid is best provided by these organizations, which are generally seen as impartial and neutral. In *Above the Fray*, Shai M. Dromi investigates why the international community overwhelmingly trusts humanitarian NGOs by looking at the historical development of their culture. With a particular focus on the Red Cross, Dromi reveals that NGOs arose because of the efforts of orthodox Calvinists, demonstrating for the first time the origins of the unusual moral culture that has supported NGOs for the past 150 years.
Books


The university is experiencing an unprecedented level of success today, as more universities in more countries educate more students in more fields. At the same time, the university has become central to a knowledge society based on the belief that everyone can, through higher education, access universal truths and apply them in the name of progress. This book traces the university’s rise over the past hundred years to become the cultural linchpin of contemporary society, revealing how the so-called ivory tower has become profoundly interlinked with almost every area of human endeavor.


Political sociology is a large and expanding field with many new developments, and The New Handbook of Political Sociology supplies the knowledge necessary to keep up with this exciting field. Written by a distinguished group of leading scholars in sociology, this volume provides a survey of this vibrant and growing field in the new millennium. The Handbook presents the field in six parts: theories of political sociology, the information and knowledge explosion, the state and political parties, civil society and citizenship, the varieties of state policies, and globalization and how it affects politics. Covering all subareas of the field with both theoretical orientations and empirical studies, it directly connects scholars with current research in the field. A total reconceptualization of the first edition, the new handbook features nine additional chapters and highlights the impact of the media and big data.
For many years, cities throughout the globe have developed ties with each other to process and nurture friendship, solidarity, and collaboration. These city relationships constitute a mode of governance distinct from those of cities that are not involved in such cross-border arrangements, with influence that expands far beyond region. In this light, *Global City-Twinning in the Digital Age* unveils an analysis of intercity relationships both on a global scale and as a global phenomenon with digital communication technologies that play key roles in upgrading traditional practices, enhancing cross-border cooperation, and facilitating the production of digital sister cities. This book analyzes the deployment of sister-city formations and operations throughout the world with a focus on cities of North America, Latin America, North Africa, Europe, and the Mediterranean region. Using a global approach, it discusses friendship, entrepreneurship, urban development, cooperative management, municipal policy, and digital entanglements. It expands the scope of study of sister cities by unveiling the role of immigrants, diaspora, and post-diaspora in the making and functioning of the digital model of sister cities.
In *Home Rule* Nandita Sharma traces the historical formation and political separation of Natives and Migrants from the nineteenth century to the present to theorize the portrayal of Migrants as “colonial invaders.” The imperial-state category of Native, initially a mark of colonized status, has been revitalized in what Sharma terms the Post-colonial New World Order of nation-states. Under post-colonial rule, claims to autochthony—being the Native “people of a place”—are mobilized to define true national belonging. Consequently, Migrants—the quintessential “people out of place”—increasingly face exclusion, expulsion, or even extermination. This turn to autochthony has led to a hardening of nationalism(s). Criteria for political membership have shrunk, immigration controls have intensified, all while practices of expropriation and exploitation have expanded. Such politics exemplify the postcolonial politics of national sovereignty, a politics that Sharma sees as containing our dreams of decolonization. *Home Rule* rejects nationalisms and calls for the dissolution of the ruling categories of Native and Migrant so we can build a common, worldly place where our fundamental liberty to stay and move is realized.

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